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Introduction

IN recent years the Federal Trade Commission has been far more
rigorous and prominent in carrying out its statutory mandates than was
the case in the past. I believe that any objective appraisal would lead to
a conclusion that the Commission of the 1970's has been revitalized. While
this revitalization has not been limited to any one area of the Commission's operation, perhaps the field which has drawn the most attention
has been the regulation of advertising. The purpose of this article is to
present an overview of current FTC activity in the field of advertising,
from the author's perspective as a staff administrator of such activity.
Probably the most fundamental development which has occurred at
the Commission in recent months has been the emergence of policies and
programs reflecting a comprehensive programmatic approach to advertising regulation. The overriding intent behind these new policies and
programs has been the substitution of rational planning for the seemingly
random processes by which matters were too often selected for Commission attention in the past.' Accordingly, this article will be devoted to the
illumination of the broad goals underlying the various programs and
cases which have been generated recently, rather than to a detailed
analysis of individual programs and cases. Hopefully, the broader discussion will provide a perspective which will aid understanding of particular
matters.
The article is divided into two major parts. The first deals with the
Commission's traditional activities of adjudication and rule-making and
primarily discusses current expansion of theories of violation, standards
of proof and remedies in advertising cases brought under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 This part contains references to a
number of pending cases, and should provide an indication of the variety
1. The Commission's commitment to rational planning is evidenced by its
creation of an Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, which in the consumer
protection area makes possible systematic selection of consumer problems most
in need of Commission attention, and maximum enforcement within the Commission's limited budget.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Section 5 (a) (1) reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."
Cases involving primarily antitrust principles are brought under the statutory
language proscribing "unfair methods of competition." The prohibition of "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" provides the basis for the bulk of the Commission's consumer protection activity, but practices falling within this language may
also amount to unfair methods of competition.
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of the types of advertising with which the Commission has become involved. The second part concerns alternatives to adjudication and rulemaking, which have been designed to supplement traditional forms of
regulation in situations in which use of the latter would be impracticable
or inappropriate.
A.

HI. Traditional Forms of Regulatory Activity
Adjudication

Although the Commission has demonstrated a serious interest in
innovative approaches to the protection of consumers from misleading
advertising, the litigated case remains the most potent weapon in the
Commission's arsenal. As in other areas of law, binding judgments and
the threat of binding judgments probably promote more honesty in
advertising than any other regulatory technique. Accordingly, heavy
emphasis has been placed on developing the potential of litigation as an
enforcement tool.
With respect to the assignment of priorities in the selection of cases to
be brought under the Commission's adjudicative procedure, efforts are
being made to utilize the Commission's limited resources in a manner
that most effectively provides the greatest possible benefit to the consuming public. Whereas in the past, it often seemed that small companies
whose unlawful activities posed relatively minor threats to the public
interest were overly represented on the list of respondents in Commission
cases, resources are now being allocated primarily to attacks on deceptions practiced by large-scale national advertisers whose unlawful
activities have major consequences in terms of the public interest.
In addition, efforts are being made to develop more fully the Commission's section 5 powers with respect to advertising, both in the area of
deceptive advertising and under the emerging "unfairness doctrine."3
The following section discusses cases structured primarily within the
"deception" framework and which add important new dimensions to the
traditional deceptive advertising case.
1. Deceptive Advertising
The broad, general prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in section 54 is the basic source of the Commission's authority
3. The term "unfairness doctrine," as used in this article, will refer to the
principle that the Commission has the power to attack business practices which
have an unfair impact on consumers, regardless of whether the practice is deceptive to consumers or anti-competitive in the traditional antitrust sense. See notes
40-90 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 2 supra.
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concerning the regulation of advertising. The Act also contains a narrow provision, section 12, 5 which expressly prohibits the dissemination of "false advertisements" for foods, drug, cosmetics and devices.6
Until quite recently, the Commission's advertising cases were brought
virtually exclusively under either the section 5 prohibition of "deceptive
acts or practices," or the section 12 prohibition of "false advertisements," or both. Presently, despite the enormous potential for litigation
under the "unfairness doctrine," cases attacking false or misleading
advertising under sections 5 and 12 continue to play a crucial role in the
Commission's overall enforcement program.
This type of case, for example, has been the vehicle for development of
the highly controversial remedy of "corrective advertising." Since the
corrective advertising remedy is involved in most of the cases which will
be discussed in this section, some introductory information concerning
this concept is presented below.
a.

Corrective Advertising
Generally speaking, an advertiser subject to a Commission order containing a corrective advertising provision is required to disclose in its
advertisements that the Federal Trade Commission has found that
previous advertising for the product in question was deceptive in some
respect, and to provide the truthful information necessary to correct the
7
deception.
The theory behind corrective advertising is that a deceptive advertisement has a "life of its own," and that the misleading impression lingers
in the minds of the public and continues to influence purchasing decisions
after the unlawful advertising itself has been discontinued. The consumer
expects, in the normal course of events, to see the end of an advertising
campaign. The simple fact that an advertising campaign no longer
appears does not tell him that the claims were not well-founded. Providing
information to enable the consumer to "rethink" his purchasing decision
(which was based on the misleading information),is one of the primary
functions of corrective advertising.
5. Federal Trade Commission Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
6. Subsection (b) of Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1970), provides that the
dissemination of a false advertisement within the purview of subsection (a) of
Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1970), shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice
within the meaning of § 5.
7. Compliance with FTC orders is insured by the Compliance Staff which
monitors the advertiser's performance under the order in accordance with mechanics
specified in the Commissioner's Rules; 16 CFR § 3.61 (1971).
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In addition, corrective advertising may help to restore market shares
to law-abiding competitors who, along with consumers, were victims of
deceptive advertising. Presumably, the consumers' re-evaluation of the
falsely advertised product, on the basis of the correct information, will
result in a shifting of sales from the false advertiser to his competitors.
The remedy is not intended to deprive a false advertiser of sales per se,
but only of sales that were gained through unlawful advertising. The
intent is to restore competitive conditions to where they would have
been if no false advertising had occurred.
Corrective advertising is a sharp departure from the traditional Commission remedies of "cease-and-desist" and "affirmative disclosure." The
cease-and-desist order, frequently called a mere admonition to "go forth
and sin no more," is simply an order to discontinue advertising deceptively. The affirmative disclosure, which may provide some incidental
correction of misimpressions caused by past deceptive advertising, is
designed primarily to provide information without which the advertisement containing the disclosure would be deceptive.' Corrective advertising, on the other hand, corrects misimpressions caused by past
advertising, even if current advertising for the product is completely
truthful. Corrective advertising is thus designed to deprive false advertisers of the fruits of their unlawful conduct, by actually divesting them
of the residual benefits of their past deception. While such attempts to
restore competitive conditions to the status quo ante may seem novel as
applied to false advertising matters, the same principle is the basis for
the remedy of divestiture, which the Commission has used for several
years to fashion relief in antitrust cases involving mergers or monopolies.9
As might be expected, the Commission's utilization of the corrective
advertising remedy has stimulated vigorous criticism from the advertising
8. Affirmative disclosure may be required: (1) where the total impression
created by the advertisement is deceptive in light of claims or representations
(deceptive half-truths), not literally false or deceptive in themselves, made by
the advertiser; or (2) where no such claim or representation is made in the advertisement, but there is a "pure" failure to disclose a material fact. For a discussion
of affirmative disclosure, see Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation
to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) [hereinafter cited

as Statement of Basis].
9.

See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Ekco

Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
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industry and fairly extensive scholarly comment. 10 In addition, the
remedy as yet remains untested in the courts. Most of the discussion of
corrective advertising, however, has centered on the Commission's selection of cases in which to seek the remedy, and the methods of implementation in specific cases. In my view, no persuasive arguments have
been raised against the concept of corrective advertising as such. Indeed,
while the Commission itself, on the basis of factual considerations, has
declined to impose corrective advertising in two cases, 1 its opinion in
each case has asserted its authority to require corrective advertising in
a proper case.' 2
As is the case with most novel legal concepts, time and experience in
working with corrective advertising will be required to work out in
detail the most satisfactory methods of administration of the remedy.
Much knowledge has already been gained from litigation of cases in
which this remedy was sought, and further testing of the concept in
specific cases will undoubtedly remain the best method of developing
the remedy. A discussion of some actual cases involving deceptive advertising follows.
10. See Notes, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 477 (1972); Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No,
Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 Mich.
L. Rev. 374 (1972); Corrective Advertising-The New Response To Consumer
Deception, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1972); The Limits of FTC Power to Issue
Consumer Protection Orders, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 496 (1972). See also
Anderson and Winer, Corrective Advertising: The FTC's New Formula for Effective Relief, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 312 (1972).
11. Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
18,897,
18,706, at 21,077 (FTC Mar. 24, 1969) (proposed complaint); id.
at 21,231 (FTC June 3, 1970) (Consent Order provisionally accepted); id.
19,261, at 21,421 (FTC May 25, 1970) (Consent Order finally accepted).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
19,011, at 21,267 (FTC June 29, 1970) (proposed complaint); 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. 19,773, at 21,814 (FTC Aug. 17, 1971) (initial decision); id. $ 20,112,
at 22,069 (FTC Sept. 22, 1972) (final order).
. 12. In the Campbell Soup opinion, the Commission stated: "We have no
doubt as to the Commission's power to require such affirmative disclosures when
such disclosures are reasonably related to the deception found and are required
in order to dissipate the effects of that deception." [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. 19,261, at 21,423 (FTC May 25, 1970). Similarly, the Firestone opinion states: "[W]e conclude that an order requiring corrective advertising is well within the arsenal of relief provisions which the Commission may draw
upon in fashioning effective remedial measures to bring about a termination of
the acts or practices found to have been unfair or deceptive. If such relief is
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Nutritional Advertising

Few areas of advertising regulated by the Federal Trade Commission,
have as significant an impact on the well-being of consumers as nutritional advertising. Recently, it has become clear that although the United
States is the most affluent society which has existed, we are not a well-fed
nation. The White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health
brought into sharp focus this anomaly and pinpointed three problems
relating to malnutrition existing in the United States today. 13 First and
certainly most urgent is the poverty and deprivation afflicting a significant minority of our population. The second concerns population groups
which have a sufficient income to achieve adequate nutrition but are not
utilizing their income wisely in purchasing and consuming food products. The third problem, and perhaps the one most closely related to
advertising, is the increasing occurrence of diseases in which the quality
and quantity of the dietary intake are recognized factors.
In attempting to deal with these problems, the report of the White
House Conference stated unequivocally that one basic right of individuals in our society is the right to proper food and proper nourishment."4 But, in order to exercise that right effectively, every citizen must
know enough about food and nutrition to choose for himself those
foods which will supply his nutritional needs. Despite the great range
and influence of our educational system and our communications media,
many of our citizens, both rich and poor, educated and uneducated, lack
this necessary knowledge. In fact, the White House Conference Report
stated:
The gaps in our public knowledge about nutrition, along with actual misinformation carriedby some media, are contributing seriously to the problem of hunger
and malnutrition in the United States.' 5

With respect to the goal of educating consumers, not only has there
been a failure to use the mass media for dissemination of positive educational nutrition information, but some commercial messages in food

advertising which purport to-be -educational have in fact been counterwarranted to prevent continuing injury to the public, it is neither punitive nor
20,112, at 22,085 (FTC Sept. 22, 1972)
retrospective." 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(final order).
13. White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health, Final Report
(1969).
14. Id. at 179.
15.

Id. (emphasis added).
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educational. The White House Conference reported that "[n]o other area
of the national health probably is as abused by deception and misinformation as nutrition.""' What has happened is that the three basic rights
of consumers, as delineated by the White House experts and various
consumer groups, have been denied. Those rights are the right to know,
the right to be heard, and the right to be protected from hidden exploitation. 7 In examining the need for consumer education and the restriction
of counter-education the conference recommended that Congress be
asked to increase the budget and authority of the Federal Trade Commission to deal with food advertising matters, and to grant the Commission power to impose stronger penalties than the cease-and-desist order,
which the conference felt was "not a sufficient deterrent to deceptive
8
promotional practices.'
The staff of the Commission's Division of National Advertising considers the Final Report of the White House Conference to be a mandate
to assure the consumer that he will not be misled by illegal advertising
when he spends his food dollars. Since the submission of the report the
Commission has assigned high priority to the regulation of deceptive
food and beverage advertising.
With respect to the advertising of basic "staple" foods, the Commission has recently attacked nutritional claims in advertisements for
Wonder Bread.' 9 The complaint in this case alleges generally that the
ITT Continental Baking Company, Inc. and its advertising agency, Ted
Bates & Company, Inc. falsely represented in advertisements that Wonder Bread is an outstanding source of nutrients, distinct from other
enriched breads, and that Wonder Bread provides a child with all the
nutrients that are essential to healthful growth and development. The
complaint alleges that: (1) Wonder Bread in truth is a standardized
enriched bread, (2) it contains the same amounts and kinds of nutrients
as most other enriched breads, (3) all enriched breads are required
by law to contain minimum levels of certain nutrients, and (4) Wonder
Bread will not provide a child with all the nutrients that are essential to
16. Id. at 190.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 191-92.
19. ITT Continental Baking Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,539, at 21,613. (FTC
19,779, at 21,817 (FTC Aug. 24,
Mar. 16, 1971) (proposed complaint); id.
1971) (complaint issued). The complaint also contains an "unfairness" allegation, which is discussed in the context of the "Unfairness Doctrine." See note 63
infra and accompanying text.

1973]

ADVERTISING

REGULATION

357

healthful growth and development. It should be noted that, contrary to
the statements of some commentators, the Wonder Bread charges do not
challenge as illegal any advertising for standardized products which fail
to disclose that the product is standardized. The complaint does attack
representations that a standardized product is something which it is not.
The ITT complaint also challenges nutritional claims for .Hostess
Snack Cakes, alleging that advertisements for such cakes represent that:
(1) the cakes provide children with good nutrition, without also disclos-

ing that they are composed primarily of sugar; and (2) the fortification
of the cakes constitutes a major nutritional advance, when it is in fact
the equivalent of using enriched flour to make the cakes, a process that
has long been available.
The order that the Commission's staff is seeking in this case would
prohibit a variety of false nutritional claims in advertisements for "any
food product" advertised by the respondents.20 In addition, the order
contains a corrective advertising provision which would require that not
less than twenty-five per cent of the advertising expenditures for Wonder
Bread for one year be devoted to advertisements each of which consists
exclusively of a clear and conspicuous disclosure that:
The Federal Trade Commission has found that Wonder Bread has been falsely
advertised as more nutritious and better for the growth of children than other
white enriched breads, 2and that Wonder :Bread is nutritionally identical to other
white enriched breads. '
20. ITT Continental Baking Co., Initial Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order submitted by counsel supporting the complaint at 185-88
(Oct. 18, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Initial Proposed Findings]. The main pro,
vision of the order would prohibit claims that any food product subject to a
Standard of Food Identity promulgated by any department or agency ,of the
federal government is in any way unique or superior as compared to any other
food product subject to the same Standard, unless: (1) the claim of uniqueness
or comparative superiority is true; (2) the specific manner in which the product
is unique or superior is disclosed in detail; and (3) it is disclosed that the product
is in all other relevant respects the same as any other product subject to the same
Standard of Food Identity. Also proscribed would be representations that: (1)
any food product is in any way necessary or essential for good health, development or nutrition, or helps build bodies twelve ways or any other number of
ways; (2) any food product containing sugar as its primary ingredient is
nutritious, unless the sugar content is disclosed; and (3) fortification of a product
with vitamins and minerals constitutes a major nutritional advance.
21. Initial Proposed Findings 188. The order provides that: (1) the corrective advertisements must be given prior approval by authorizedrepresentatives of
the FTC; (2) approved radio and TV advertisements rMust be disseminated in the
same time periods and markets as the challenged advertisements; and (3)
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The charges in the ITT complaint were dismissed in an Initial
Decision by Administrative Law Judge Raymond J. Lynch on December 27, 1972.22 In reaching his decision Judge Lynch found that,
among other things: (1) Wonder Bread advertisements had no impact
on consumers that was specific to the attribute of nutrition or was a
function of the claims made; (2) exposure to Wonder Bread television
advertising that promotes nutrition does not cause consumers to perceive Wonder Bread as more nutritious than other breads; and (3) none
of the challenged advertising for Wonder Bread contained, either
directly or by implication, any of the representations alleged in the
complaint.
As to Hostess Snack Cake advertisements, Judge Lynch found that
the claims made for this product were comparative in nature and
stressed the difference between the new enriched product and comparable products that were not enriched. The Judge found that no advertisement included any express or implied representation that Hostess
Snack Cakes contained all essential vitamins, and that, contrary to the
allegation of the complaint, the enrichment of this product was not the
nutritional equivalent of enriched flour, but in fact produced a considerably higher level of enrichment.
In addition, Judge Lynch ruled that the record failed to establish any
basis upon which corrective advertising might properly be ordered. He
found no reliable evidence that past nutrition advertising or any other
assertedly false Wonder Bread advertising was presently contributing to
sales or ever had any impact on sales. As to Hostess Snack Cakes, the
Judge found that dissemination of the challenged advertising utilizing
the "major nutritional advance" slogan was not sufficiently great to
support corrective advertising.
This Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge is not a final
decision of the Commission, and, under the Commission's procedures,
may be appealed to the full Commission. The staff's appeal of the
approved print advertisements must appear in the same print media as the challenged advertisements. It should be noted that the order requested by complaint
counsel in the proposed findings differs in a number of respects from the order
which was included in the complaint issued by the Commission. See 3 Trade
Reg. Rep. 19,779, at 21,817 (FTC Aug. 24, 1971). These changes resulted from
developments in the evidence presented at the hearing.
22. ITT Continental Baking Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
20,182, at 22,162
(FTC Dec. 27, 1972) (initial order to dismiss).
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rulings of the Administrative Law Judge was argued before the Commission on April 18, 1973 and at this writing is pending decision.
Also attacked in the proposed complaint in the ITT case were weight
reduction claims for Profile Bread. The proposed complaint alleged that
Profile had been misrepresented to be lower in calories than ordinary
bread and of special and significant value for use in weight control diets.
The part of the case involving Profile Bread was settled on the basis of
a consent order2 which is significant in that it contains the first corrective
advertising provision to appear in a final order issued by the Commission. This provision requires that for one year at least twenty-five per
cent of the advertising budget for the product "for each media in each
market be devoted to FTC-approved advertisements that Profile is not
effective for weight reduction, contrary to possible interpretations of
24
prior advertising.
Another pending case involving nutritional advertising for a basic
food product is Amstar Corp.25 The major charges in the Amstar complaint are that the corporation and its advertising agencies, Lewis &
Gilman, Inc., and Dailey & Associates have misrepresented in advertisements that Domino and Spreckels brands of sugar: (1) will give
strength, energy and stamina to everyone; (2) will enable professional
athletes to perform better; (3) are substantially different from all other
refined sugars in composition and food value; (4) are as necessary a
23. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,681, at 21,727 (FTC July 2, 1971) (consent
order provisionally accepted); id.
19,780, at 21,817 (FTC Aug. 17, 1971)
(consent order finally accepted).
24. Id.
19,681, at 21,728. "Approved radio and television commercials
must be run in the same time periods during the same seasons as other radio and
TV ads for Profile, and approved print advertising must appear in the same print
media as other Profile advertisements." Id. In one television commercial, which
has already appeared, containing this disclosure an actress says: "'I'd like to clear
up any misunderstanding you may have... about Profile Bread from its advertising or even its name. Does Profile have fewer calories than other breads? No, Profile has about the same per ounce as other breads. To be exact, Profile has 7 fewer
calories per slice. That's because it's sliced thinner. But eating Profile will not
cause you to lose weight. A reduction of 7 calories is insignificant . . . .'" Newsweek, Sept. 27, 1971, at 98. The deletion of the requirement of a disclosure
in the corrective advertisements to the effect that the FTC had alleged that prior
advertising of Profile was deceptive resulted from settlement negotiations as to
this part of the case.
25. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,696, at 21,742 (FTC July 12, 1971) (proposed
complaint); id. 20,004, at 22,004 (FTC May 8, 1972) (complaint issued).
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factor in staying healthy as sleeping and exercising; and (5) have been
selected as the "official sugar" of various athletic organizations because
of their superior quality and nutritional value.
In addition to prohibiting such representations in advertisements for
"any food product" advertised by the respondents, the order being
sought by the Commission's staff would proscribe claims that any food
product is in any way necessary or essential for proper or good health
or to enable one to lead an active life. Finally, the Amstar order would
require corrective advertising disclosures for one year stating that the
advertised sugar "is not an especial or unique source of strength, energy
and stamina."
In the beverage area, the Commission has accepted a consent order
signed by Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. and its advertising agency, Ted
Bates &Company, Inc. concerning the advertising of Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail. 26 The advertising representations challenged by
the Commission's complaint were the claims that Ocean Spray contains:
(1) a greater variety and quantity of nutrients than orange or tomato
juice, and from a nutritional standpoint, can be substituted for these
juices at breakfast; (2) more "food energy" than orange juice; and
(3) cranberry juice entirely. The order prohibits claims that "any
beverage made by Ocean Spray or, in the case of Ted Bates, any beverage which is advertised as a product made with cranberries: (a) contains as many or a greater variety or quantity of nutrients than orange
or tomato juice or any other beverage, unless this is true ... 2 (b) has
more 'food energy' than any other beverage unless clear disclosure is
made that this term refers to calories; and (c) is a 'juice' unless it consists entirely of natural or reconstituted single strength fruit juice with
no water added ....
In addition, the order contains a corrective advertising provision
19,477, at 21,555
26. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(FTC Feb. 11, 1971) (proposed complaint); id. 19,604, at 21,648 (FTC Apr.
19,981, at 21,993 (FTC Mar. 2, 1972)
22, 1971) (complaint issued); id.
20,051, at 22,028 (FTC June 23,
id.
accepted);
provisionally
(consent order
1972) (consent order finally accepted).
27. "This does not prohibit representations which merely propose using any
such product in place of other beverages without assigning any nutritional reason.. . ." Id. 19,981, at 21,993 (FTC Mar. 2, 1972).
28. This does not prohibit: (1) the addition of any ingredient to sweeten,
flavor, preserve, fortify or color such fruit juice; (2) descriptions such as "juice
cocktail" or "juice drink" connoting a diluted or modified single strength juice;

or (3) any name approved by any federal agency having appropriate jurisdiction.
Id.

19,981, at 21,993 (FTC Mar. 2, 1972).
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which requires, as to advertising for Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail, that for a one-year period at least one out of every four advertisements of equal time or space for each medium in each market, or, in
the alternative, not less than twenty-five per cent of the media expenditures (excluding production costs) for each medium in each market,
be devoted to a prescribed corrective advertising message which discloses that representations in earlier advertising that Ocean Spray
contained more "food energy" than orange juice were referring to
29
calories and not to vitamins or minerals.
In a second beverage case involving nutritional advertising, an Administrative Law Judge 0 of the Commission recently issued an initial
decision dismissing the complaint against the Coca-Cola Co. and its
advertising agency, the Marschalk Co., Inc. 1 Involved are claims
concerning the nature, content and nutritive value of Hi-C fruit drinks.
The primary misrepresentations alleged in the complaint are that Hi-C
is: (1) the beverage that is "The Sensible Drink," nutritionally and
economically, as a source of Vitamin C; (2) made with fresh fruit and
has a high fruit content comparable to fresh fruits and fruit juices;
(3) unqualifiedly good for children, and children can drink as much
of it as they like without adverse health or nutritional implications; and
(4) particularly high in Vitamin C content even as compared to other
beverages widely known as high in Vitamin C content, specifically citrus
fruit juices.
The proposed order in this case would have prohibited such representations, and would have compelled the company to devote twenty-five
29. The required text of the message, which is incorporated into the order
as an attachment, is as follows: "If you've'wondered what some of our earlier
advertising meant when we said Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail has more
food energy than orange juice or tomato juice, let us make it clear: we didn't
mean vitamins and minerals. Food energy means calories. Nothing more. Food

energy is important at breakfast since many of us may not get enough calories, or
food energy, to get off to a good start. Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail
helps because it contains more food energy than most other breakfast drinks. And
Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail gives you and your family Vitamin C plus
a great wake-up taste. It's .

.

. the other breakfast drink." Id.

30. The title of the officials who preside over administrative hearings of Commission cases has recently been changed from "Hearing Examiner" to "Administrative Law Judge."
31. The Coca-Cola Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,351, at 21,484 (FTC Sept. 29,
1970) (proposed complaint); id.
19,603, at 21,648 (FTC Apr. 14, 1971)
(complaint issued); id.
20,108, at 22,067 (FTC Sept. 15, 1972) (initial
decision).
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per cent of each advertisement for Hi-C for one year to a disclosure that
the FTC had found that past advertisements for Hi-C were misleading in
that they gave the false impression that the nutritive value of the drink
was the equivalent of orange juice or other citrus juices.
The Administrative Law Judge, however, rejected the contention of
complaint counsel that representations that Hi-C was "high in Vitamin
C" were comparing the drink to orange juice. He found that the advertisements, which contained no express references to orange juice, represented simply that the Vitamin C content of Hi-C was high "in relation
to the normal nutritional needs of human beings," and he determined
that the record showed that this claim was true.
In addition, the Judge took the position that the consent order accepted by the Commission in the Ocean Spray case established that it is
permissable to link references to the Vitamin C content of Ocean Spray
with the slogan "The Other Breakfast Drink. 3 2 Thus, he noted, a slogan
which specifically evokes a comparison to orange juice is permitted in
juxtaposition to a Vitamin C claim, even though the Ocean Spray
product contains less Vitamin C than orange juice, and one third less
Vitamin C than Hi-C. Under these circumstances, the Judge determined
it would be inconsistent to prohibit advertising representations that Hi-C
is "high" in Vitamin C, where, as the Judge found, the advertisement
"makes no reference to orange juice."
Finally, the Judge held that the slogan "The Sensible Drink" did
not, as contended by complaint counsel, represent that Hi-C was the
sole beverage that was sensible, nutritionally and economically, as a
source of Vitamin C. Rather, Judge Jackson found the phrase would be
understood by consumers to mean simply that Hi-C was a natural, good
tasting product which carried a nutritional benefit-Vitamin C. In addition, the Judge concluded that Hi-C was in fact a "sensible" source of
Vitamin C, since it was "high" in Vitamin C, and since it costs less to
secure a child's recommended dietary allowance of the vitamin from
Hi-C than from all but one form of citrus fruit juice. Complaint counsel
in the Hi-C case have appealed this Initial Decision, on the basis that
Judge Jackson's interpretations of the challenged advertising and the
applicable law were erroneous and this matter is currently pending
before the Commission.
It should be apparent from the above discussion that the ITT, Amstar,
Ocean Spray and Hi-C cases all have far-reaching implications in the
area of nutritional advertising. The questions of whether one brand of a
32. See note 26 supra.
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basic food product may be advertised as nutritionally superior to another brand belonging to the same standardized product group, and
whether a product which is not composed entirely of natural ingredients
and is nutritionally inferior to its natural counterpart may be nutritionally compared to the natural counterpart, involve very fundamental
principles which apply to numerous products other than those which
were the subjects of these cases. Hopefully, by bringing cases raising
pervasive issues such as these, the Commission will have a constructive
impact on nutritional advertising in the United States.
As a final comment on the regulation of nutritional advertising, it
should be pointed out that steps are being taken to develop comprehensive Commission policy positions in nutritional matters. Such efforts are
being implemented not only by the Commission's legal and planning
staff, but also by a full-time nutritionist who has recently joined the
staff of the Division of National Advertising. It seems clear to me that
future needs of the public for an effective program of advertising regulation by the FTC will require the services of those trained in disciplines
other than the law. While FTC will remain primarily a legal agency, it
needs to give more consideration to economists, consumer behavior specialists, nutritionists, psychologists and professional planners if its future
activity is to be properly channeled.
c.

Environmental Advertising
In response to increasing public concern over the deteriorating quality
of the environment and a growing tendency among consumers to seek
out products which do not harm the environment, a new type of advertising theme has emerged. Today, advertisers often stress the ecological
or environmental benefits offered by their products rather than the direct,
individual benefits they offer the consumer. Since false representations
as to the environmental impact of products may induce consumer purchases just as effectively as more familiar forms of deception, the Commission has found it necessary to challenge certain environmental claims
made by advertisers.
Two pending Commission cases involve allegedly false anti-pollution
claims made in advertisements for gasoline. The complaint in Standard
Oil Co. of California8 charges that advertisements for Chevron gasoline
falsely represent that the additive "F-310" has a significant effect in
reducing exhaust emissions and air pollution. Similar allegations against
33. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,352, at 21,484 (FTC Sept. 29, 1970) (proposed
complaint); id. 19,428, at 21,536 (FTC Dec. 29, 1970) (complaint issued).
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advertising concerning the additive "CA-101" are made in the complaint
in Crown Central Petroleum Corp.14 The orders being sought in both
cases would prohibit such anti-pollution claims, and, in addition, the
Standard Oil order would require that twenty-five per cent of every
gasoline advertisement disseminated by the company for one year be
devoted to a corrective advertising disclosure that the Commission had
found previous advertisements for Chevron gasolines deceptive, and that
said products did not in fact reduce air pollution.
The Commission's staff is also exploring "corporate image" advertising containing representations regarding the advertiser's efforts to
preserve the environment. Advertisements of this nature often do not
involve affirmative product claims; but rather seek to create a favorable
public image for the advertiser by stressing its position on questions of
general public concern. Although such advertisements may not directly
promote the sale of consumer products, they may, if deceptive, fall
within the authority of the Federal Trade Commission, on the basis that
they provide economic benefit to the advertisers.
d.

Miscellaneous Cases
A number of deceptive advertising cases presently in various stages
of litigation do not fit within any of the broad categories of advertising
presently under scrutiny by the Commission, but are significant in that
they involve well-known products which are heavily advertised in the
national media.
In Warner-Lambert PharmaceuticalCo.,a5 for example, the Commission's complaint alleges that advertising for Listerine mouthwash
falsely represents that this product can cure or prevent colds or lessen
their severity. The proposed order seeks corrective advertising disclosures
to the effect that previous Listerine advertising contained false representations as to the effectiveness of the product as a cure, preventative and
treatment for colds and sore throats. The Listerine case is particularly
appropriate for application of the corrective advertising remedy, because
consumers have been exposed to the "colds" theme in Listerine advertising for decades, and because the product holds the largest share of the
mouthwash market.
The case of Sun Oil Co." involves allegedly false claims regarding
34. 3 Trade
complaint); id.
35. 3 Trade
complaint); id.
36. 3 Trade
complaint); id.

Reg. Rep.
19,605, at 21,648 (FTC May 3, 1971) (proposed
19,781, at 21,785 (FTC July 14, 1971) (complaint issued).Reg. Rep. 19,838, at 21,859 (FTC Nov. 3, 1971) (proposed
20,045, at 22,026 (FTC June 27, 1972) (complaint issued).
Reg. Rep.
19,856, at 21,871 (FTC Dec. 2, 1971) (proposed
20,033, at 22,020 (FTC June 2, 1972) (complaint issued).
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the superiority and uniqueness of the octane quality of Sunoco blended
gasolines. Challenged in the complaint are television commercials containing statements and demonstrations regarding two Sun "exclusives,"
"260 Action" and the "Custom Blending Pump." The commercials
depict automobiles supposedly running on Sunoco gasoline performing
such feats as pulling six railroad cars from a standing start, or pulling an
empty U-Haul trailer up a ramp specially constructed over a bank of
seats in the Los Angeles Coliseum.
The complaint alleges that the advertisements falsely represent that:
(1) only when operated on the octane of Sunoco's "Custom Blended"
gasolines will automobile engines operate at maximum power and performance; (2) the demonstrations are evidence that actually proves
Sunoco gasolines blended with "Sunoco 260 Action" are unique or
unusual in that they alone provide the power necessary to enable an
automobile to perform the task depicted; (3) blending Sunoco's highest
octane gasoline, "260," into Sunoco's lower octane gasolines conveys
to resulting blends the benefits of "260 Action," and results in blends
that provide more engine power than do competing gasolines having
octane ratings comparable to those of Sunoco's blends. The complaint
also charges that the advertisements convey the representation that
Sunoco gasoline has unique qualities. In truth, the complaint states,
octane is a measure of motor fuel anti-knock quality; and to the extent
that octane relates to power and performance, any gasoline of sufficient
octane will provide maximum power and performance. The proposed
order in this case would require corrective advertising disclosures that,
to the extent that automobile performance depends on octane levels,
automobiles do not perform better with Sunoco than with other gasolines of equal octane.
In the case of Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 the Commission has recently
issued its complaint charging that Lysol Brand disinfectants have been
deceptively advertised. The complaint primarily attacks the advertising
theme that Lysol spray kills flu virus on household surfaces, alleging that
Lysol advertisements falsely represent that use of Lysol will be of significant medical benefit in reducing the incidence and preventing the spread
of colds, influenza and other upper respiratory diseases within the home.
The complaint states that in fact: (1) germs and viruses on household
surfaces do not play a significant role in the transmission of colds, influenza and other upper respiratory diseases; (2) the use of Lysol spray
does not eliminate significant numbers of airborne germs and viruses,
19,925, at 21,937 (FTC Mar. 2, 1972) (proposed
37. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
complaint); id. 20,109, at 22,068 (FTC Sept. 21, 1972) (complaint issued).
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which are the known cause of most colds, influenza and other upper
respiratory diseases; and (3) the use of Lysol is not of significant medical
benefit in reducing the incidence or preventing the spread of colds,
influenza and other respiratory diseases within the home. The order
proposed by the Commission would require corrective advertising disclosures in accordance with the last of the foregoing three allegations
in the complaint.
Finally, a complaint has been issued attacking advertising for Dry
Ban spray anti-perspirants, alleging that certain television demonstrations concerning Dry Ban are misleading to consumers.88 In these
demonstrations, Dry Ban and a "leading anti-perspirant spray" are
sprayed on the same surface. The other spray appears white and thick
on the surface, while the Dry Ban appears clear and dry. The complaint
states that the advertisements represent that these demonstrations are
evidence which actually proves Dry Ban superior to competing antiperspirant sprays because it is a dry spray that is not wet when applied
to the body, and because it leaves no visible residue when applied to the
body. In truth, the complaint alleges Dry Ban is not a dry spray, is wet
when applied to the body, and, after application to the body, dries out
leaving a visible residue. The proposed order does not contain a corrective advertising provision, but would prohibit the respondents from
disseminating advertising which presents evidence, including tests, experiments or demonstrations, which does not actually prove the fact,
product feature or product superiority it is represented to prove.
The Listerine, Sunoco, Lysol and Dry Ban cases demonstrate that the
Commission has not become so involved in broad scale programs that it
is forced to ignore significant instances of possible misrepresentation
which happen to be unrelated to such programs. Deceptive demonstrations in television commercials for any type of product, for example,
have been and most likely will continue to be of particular interest to the
Commission, for this form of advertising can be especially persuasive to
consumers.89 In addition, questionable advertisements which are not reviewed as part of any established program may be brought to the
attention of the legal staff by the Commission's monitoring section, which
maintains continuing surveillance of advertising appearing on network
television and in the major print media.
38. Bristol-Myers Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,765, at 21,808 (FTC Aug. 20,
1971) (proposed complaint); id.
20,106, at 22,066 (FTC Sept. 12, 1972)
(complaint issued).
39. Cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
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2. The "Unfairness Doctrine"
a.

History
In March of 1972 the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.40 that section 5(a) (1) of the FTC Act empowered the Commission to attack practices which may pose no threat to competition in
the traditional antitrust sense, and may not deceive consumers, but
which are objectionable primarily because they have an unfair impact
on consumers. This holding may not appear particularly momentous in
light of the express prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in section 5(a)(1)1 However, examination of the history of the "unfairness doctrine" enunciated in the S&H case demonstrates the necessity
for and significance of a decision conclusively establishing the Commission's broad power to protect consumers from unfair business practices.
42
Prior to passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the FTC Act,
which added the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to section 5, the section had declared only "unfair methods of competition"
to be unlawful. It is clear from the legislative history that the Congress
did not intend the scope of the original language to be limited to any
particular categories of practices." Two of the early judicial interpretations of this language, however, attempted to impose the limitations
that Congress had purposely excluded from the statute. In FTC v.
Gratz,4 the Court, while acknowledging that the "exact meaning" of the
phrase "unfair methods of competition" was unclear, undertook to establish boundaries for the operation of the statute. It held that the only
practices which could be deemed unfair methods of competition were
those that were "heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as
against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or create monopoly." 5
40. 405 U.S.233 (1972).

41. See note 2 supra.
42. Act of Mar. 21, 1938 ch. 49, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, amending 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
43. The view was expressed in both the Senate Report and the House Conference Report that it would be impossible to frame statutory definitions which
would embrace all unfair practices, and that the determination of what practices
were unfair should thus be left to the Commission. See S. Rep. No. 597, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); H.R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19
(1914).
44. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).

45. Id. at 427. Accord, FrC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475
(1923); FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1923).
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While the Gratz court continued to tie the meaning of "unfair methods
of competition" to pre-existing standards of illegality, it at least recognized that the concept included something more than anti-competitive
activity of an antitrust nature. Similarly, other cases decided prior to the
Wheeler-Lea Amendments held that deception of the public could
amount to an unfair method of competition if such deception diverted
business from competitors of the advertiser.40
However, prior to the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, the courts refused
to find methods of competition unfair where no injury to present or
potential competitors was involved. This position was most clearly expressed in FTC v. Raladam Co.,47 in which the Court held that: "[t]he
paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from the evils
likely to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction of it
in a substantial degree.... Unfair trade methods are not per se unfair
methods of competition. 48
The landmark case which relaxed the restrictions imposed by Gratz
and Raladam was FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros.40 The Commission's
cease-and-desist order in Keppel prohibited the practice of selling penny
candy to children in "break and take" packs. This merchandising method
induced children to purchase candy which was less desirable in quality
and quantity than candy sold in the "straight goods" package, in the
hope of getting bonus packs containing extra candy and prizes. 5°
The Court found that although children were too young to be cap46. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 .(1922).
47. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
48. Id.at 647-49. The Court stated further: "Itis obvious that the word
'competition' imports the existence of present or potential competitors, and the
unfair methods must be such as injuriously affect or tend thus to affect the business
of these competitors-that is to say, the trader whose methods are assailed as
unfair must have present or potential rivals in trade whose business will be, or
is likely to be, lessened or otherwise injured. It is that condition of affairs which
the Commission is given power to correct, and it is against that condition of
affairs, and not some other, that the Commission is authorized to protect the
public .... If broader powers be desirable they must be conferred by Congress."
Id. at 649.
49. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
50. The Court gave as one example of "break and take" packaging an assortment of candy which "contains 60 pieces of candy, each having its retail price
marked on a slip of paper concealed within its wrapper; 10 pieces retail at 1 cent
each, 10 at 2 cents, and 40 at 3 cents. The price paid for each piece is that named
on the price ticket, ascertained only after the purchaser has selected the candy and
the wrapper has been removed." Id. at 307.
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able of intelligent judgment regarding such transactions, the practice did
not involve any fraud or deception, and that competing manufacturers
could adopt the "break and take" device at any time and thus maintain
their competitive position. However, the Court rejected the respondent's
argument, based on these premises, that the practice was beyond the
reach of the Commission. It held instead that the practice was of the sort
which the common law and criminal statutes had long deemed contrary
to public policy, because it tempted children to gamble and pressured
competitors, who were under a powerful moral compulsion not to adopt
the practice, to engage in the same reprehensible marketing technique.
Thus, the Court concluded:
[H]ere the competitive method is shown to exploit consumers, children, who
are unable to protect themselves .... It would seem a gross perversion of the
normal meaning of the word ...to hold that the method is not "unfair." 51

In reaching this result, the Court disposed of the argument, based on
Gratz and Raladam, that an unfair method of competition under section
5 necessarily involved an antitrust violation or at least incipient injury to
.competitors. The Court stated that had it been the intent of Congress to
limit the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to the prevention
of competitive methods which were forbidden at common law or were
incipient antitrust violations, such intention would have been expressly
52
manifested in the Federal Trade Commission Act.
In upholding the Commission's prohibition of this lottery method of
selling to children, the Keppel case broadened the definition of "unfair
methods of competition" in two respects. First, with respect to the
nature of the challenged practice, Keppel established that practices involving no element of deception, fraud or oppression, but which nevertheless violated public policy in some respect, could be unfair. Second,
as to the impact of the practice, Keppel established that a practice primarily unfair to consumers rather than to competitors could violate
section 5.
The Keppel principle that a business practice could constitute a violation of section 5 primarily because of its impact on consumers rather
than competitors was subsequently codified by the 1938 Wheeler-Lea
Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, which added the
phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to the original section
5(a) (1) prohibition of "unfair methods of competition." The addition
51.

Id. at 313.

52. Id. at 310.
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of this language was intended by Congress to make it clear that section 5 authorized the Commission to protect consumers as well as
competitors.5 8 Furthermore, the prohibition of "unfair" as well as "deceptive" acts or practices makes it clear that Congress realized that
consumers could be injured by unfair practices, as well as by the deceptive practices which were attacked in cases prior to the amendments.
The case law which has evolved under section 5 since the WheelerLea Act has given effect to this congressional intent to a substantial
extent. Presently, in section 5 cases challenging deceptive acts or practices, including deceptive advertising, injury to consumers is usually the
primary injury alleged.5
In addition, a considerable body of case law has developed in which
various acts and practices have been forbidden primarily because of
their unfairness to consumers, rather than to competitors. 5 Until very
recently, however, cases in which unfairness to consumers was found
usually involved actual business practices, other than advertising, which
usually have been so blatantly inequitable or coercive as to evince actual
intent to defraud consumers.5 An exception to this rule has been the
line of cases banning use of lottery methods of merchandising similar
to that involved in Keppel 57 Deception, antitrust violations and lot53. The House Report on the amendment stated: "[T]his amendment makes
the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern,
before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods
of a dishonest competitor." H.R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
See also S. Rep. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936). A further indication
of the congressional intent to make the Federal Trade Commission Act more consumer-oriented by the addition of the Wheeler-Lea amendments is the fact that these
amendments also added § 15, which declared the dissemination of false advertisements for foods, drugs, cosmetics and devices to be an unfair or deceptive act or
practice under section 5.
54. With relation to "deceptive advertising," see notes 4-39 supra and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., cases cited in Statement of Basis, supra note 8; Illinois Fraternal
News, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 165 (1964); Trade Advertising Associates, 65 F.T.C. 650
(1964).
56. See, e.g., Illinois Fraternal News, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 165 (1964) and Trade
Advertising Associates, 65 FTC 650 (1964), in which the Commission found
to be an unfair practice the publishing of advertisements without having received
orders therefor, and then seeking to exact payment for the unauthorized advertisements through means such as repeated "demand" letters and threats of legal
action.
57. See, e.g., Modernistic Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1944);
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teries aside, however, with respect to the nature of practices found to
be unfair within the meaning of section 5, very little real development has
occurred, since the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, beyond the Gratz formulation of practices "characterized by bad faith, fraud or oppression. 1 8
Nothing inherent in the meaning of the term "unfair act or practice"
limits its operation to the practices discussed above. Just as the term
"deceptive acts or practices" has been construed to include deceptive
advertising, so the term "unfair acts or practices" may include unfair
advertising, as well as other types of unfair practices. Furthermore, the
meaning of "unfair" is not limited to practices which border on fraud,
oppression or gambling. Many advertising and other business practices
which do not reach these extremes are nevertheless inequitable and exploitive in nature, and have seriously detrimental effects on consumers.
Such practices should be actionable under section 5.
Section 5 is an intentionally flexible standard. No comprehensive
definition of the term "unfair" is possible or desirable. In this section,
Congress gave the Commission the power to determine, within broad
limits, what new or different kinds of trade practices should be forbidden because they are unfair to the consuming public. Rather than limiting the Commission's authority to the prevention of business activity
violating established standards of legality, it empowered the Commission
to evaluate particular business practices in the contexts in which they are
utilized.5"
The Commission has already incorporated these principles into a
number of complaints and proposed complaints issued prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in S&H. For example, proposed complaints
issued against the six major advertisers of cigarettes in the United States,
in addition to charging that the failure to disclose the health hazards of
smoking in cigarette advertisements is deceptive, contained a separate
J.C. Martin Corp., 66 FTC 1 (1964), aft'd, 346 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 975 (1966); and Sun Distributing Co., 64 FTC 681 (1964).
58. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
59. As the Supreme Court stated in Keppel: "It is unnecessary to attempt a
comprehensive definition of the unfair methods which are banned, even if it were
possible to do so. We do not intimate either that the statute does not authorize
the prohibition of other and hitherto unknown methods of competition or, on
the other hand, that the Commission may prohibit every unethical competitive
practice regardless of its particular character or consequences. New or different
practices must be considered as they arise in the light of the circumstances in
which they are employed." FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314
(1934).
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allegation that the advertising of cigarettes without making clear and
conspicuous disclosures in said advertisements that cigarette smoking is
dangerous to health is "in itself' an unfair practice.60 Similarly, in Philip
Morris, Inc.,6" which involved the distribution of sample razor blades
through insertion in home-delivered newspapers, the gravamen of the
Commission's complaint is the principle that this practice is unfair to
consumers because of the safety hazard it creates. Thus, in matters
involving advertising, and other promotional practices approaching advertising, which endanger the health or safety of consumers, the Commission has demonstrated a willingness to take a broad view of its
powers under the unfairness doctrine. In addition, the principle that
an advertiser should have prior substantiation for representations made
in its advertisements6 2 is based primarily on unfairness considerations.
This approach is also reflected in other recent cases not directly involving health or safety issues. The ITT Continental Baking Company
complaint, 6 for example, contained an allegation that Wonder Bread
advertisements are unfair to children in that they tend "to exploit childrens' aspirations for rapid and healthy growth by falsely portraying
Wonder Bread as an extraordinary food for producing dramatic growth
4
in them.

6

Although the S&H case 5 did not involve a question of advertising, it
must be considered an affirmation of the Commission's power to attack
advertising which is unfair to consumers. At issue in this case was the
60. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., The Lorillard Corp., Philip Morris,
Inc., R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., American Brands, Inc., and Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,687, at 21,729 (FTC July 1, 1971) (proposed complaints); id.
19,902, at 21,919 (FTC Jan. 31, 1972) (consent orders provisionally accepted); id.
19,965, at 21,986 (FTC Mar. 30, 1972) (consent
orders finally accepted).
61. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,548, at 21,620 (FTC Mar. 12, 1971) complaint
issued); id. 20,153, at 22,141 (FTC Dec. 1, 1972) (consent order provisionally
accepted).
62. This general principle was the foundation both for the Commission's complaint in the Pfizer case and for the Commission's Advertising Substantiation
Program. See notes 102-17 infra and accompanying text.
63. See note 19 supra.
64. In his initial decision dismissing the ITT Continental complaint, the Administrative Law Judge ruled that only a small proportion of very young children
were susceptible to exploitation by television commercials and that empirical data
shows the incidence of childrens' efforts to influence bread purchases is relatively
small. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.

65. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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legality of S&H's attempt to discourage "trafficking" in its trading
stamps. Such trafficking is carried on primarily by professional trading
stamp exchanges, which will sell books of S&H or other brands of
stamps to consumers, or will trade one brand of stamps for another
brand. These exchanges allow consumers, who acquire small numbers
of a variety of different brands of stamps, to convert all of their stamps
into one brand. This facilitates the accumulation by consumers of sufficient numbers of stamps of one brand to redeem them for desired items.
Trafficking is also engaged in by retail merchants, who, rather than issuing stamps themselves, offer discounts on their own goods in return for
S&H stamps.
Both these methods reduce the incentive for the consumer to return
to the merchant who originally issued the S&H stamps to obtain more
stamps, and in turn reduce the incentive for the merchant to buy and
distribute the stamps. S&H attempted to pre-empt such trafficking by
contractual provisions, reflected in a notice on the inside cover of every
S&H stamp book. This notice, in essence, states that the consumer may
not exchange or transfer S&H stamps or stamp books, and that the only
right the consumer acquires in said stamps is to paste them in books and
return them to S&H for redemption. In a number of lawsuits filed over
a period of years against commercial exchanges and merchants, S&II
won injunctions against unauthorized redemption or exchange of its
stamps. It also sent numerous letters threatening legal action to other
stamp exchanges and merchants, almost all of which agreed to discontinue the unauthorized practices.
The Commission found that this suppression of the operation of
trading stamp exchanges and other "free and open" redemption of
stamps violated section 5. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the Commission, stating that the type
of practice the Commission has the power to declare unfair must be
either a per se violation of the antitrust policy, a violation of the letter
of the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts, or a violation of
the spirit of these Acts.66 The court of appeals further held that S&H's
conduct had not violated the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, and
vacated the Commission's order.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, held that the court of appeals
erred in its construction of section 5. 7 It held that a challenged practice
66. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), modified
and remanded to FTC, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
67. 405 U.S. at 245 (1972).
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which has an anticompetitive impact but does not violate the letter or
spirit of the antitrust laws may nevertheless be an unfair method of
competition, and that a practice having an unfair impact on consumers
may be an unfair act or practice in violation of section 5 without regard
to competitive impact. In so holding, the Court stated that neither of the
limiting interpretations of section 5 adopted in Gratz and Raladam
survived to support the lower court's view, and that the Keppel case sets
the standard by which the range of FTC jurisdiction is to be measured
today. 8
The Court delineated the Commission's power over unfair practices
as follows:
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade
Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice
against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a
court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the anti-trust laws. 69

Because the question of whether the practices engaged in by S&H
were actually unfair to consumers had not been decided by the Commission, the Court remanded the case to the Commission for determination
of this issue. 71 Since it has not yet been decided whether these practices
are unfair acts or practices prohibited by section 5, the actual facts of
the S&H case provide little guidance as to the nature of the activities
which would be unfair to consumers under the Court's view of section 5.
Nevertheless, the Court's comparing the Commission to a court of
equity, and affirming the power of the Commission to consider "public
values" beyond those reflected in the antitrust laws, are extremely important developments in the evolution of section 5. They indicate that the
Commission has been following the proper course in its recent attacks
on unfair advertising, and thus encourage continued pursuit of these
attacks.
Because the Commission, to a significant extent, has already been ex68. Id. at 242.
69. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
70. The Court stated that it had to look to the Commission's opinion, not the
arguments of its counsel, for the underpinnings of the Commission's order.
While the issue of unfairness to consumers had been raised by Commission
counsel, the Commission's opinion was premised on the classic antitrust rationale
of restraint of trade and injury to competition. Since the Court could not label
the practice "unfair," but could only affirm or vacate the Commission's judgment
to that effect, it had to remand the case to the Commission for determination
under the proper construction of § 5 enunciated by the Court. Id. at 246.
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ercising the power acknowledged by the Supreme Court in S&H, this
opinion should not be regarded as a signal which will stimulate frenzied
attacks on a multitude of advertising practices never before challenged.
Furthermore, the opinion did advert to certain factors, previously designated by the Commission, which are relevant to the question of whether
a particular practice is unfair. These factors are:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common
law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2)
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; (3) whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers ....
71

In response to the argument of S&H that activity meeting the third of
these criteria was not unfair unless it also met one of the first two, the
Court indicated that the meaning of these criteria was that a method of
selling violates section 5 if it is at least "exploitive or inequitable and if,
in addition to being morally objectionable, it is seriously detrimental to
consumers or others.

'72

These standards against which the fairness of business practices is to
be measured are necessarily general and broad in scope. Although their
enunciation in a Supreme Court opinion is not likely to bring about
radical changes in the Commission's present enforcement policies, it
does encourage further development of concepts of unfairness presently
being utilized by the Commission.
One area to which further application of unfairness principles would
seem highly appropriate is advertising addressed to children. 73 The pri-

mary flaw in most objectionable children's advertising is its failure to
compensate for the lack of maturity and experience of its audience. Any
resulting deception of children usually is incidental to this fundamental
unfairness. This theory could also be extended to cover advertising
which attempts to exploit the disabilities of other "special audiences,"
such as elderly, handicapped, or non-English speaking persons.
In addition, it is probable that the Commission will continue to use
the unfairness doctrine to attack advertising claims which are not supported by substantiation sufficient to provide a "reasonable basis" for
the claim. This "reasonable basis" principle, and its relationship to the
unfairness doctrine are the subject of the following discussion.
71.

Id. at 244 n.5, citing Statement of Basis, supra note 8, at 8355.

72. 405 U.S. at 244 n.5.
73. See notes 91-97 infra and accompanying text.
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b.

The "Reasonable Basis" Standard
The principle that an advertiser should have, at the time he makes an
advertising representation, substantiation sufficient to provide a "reasonable basis" for the representation, was set forth in the Commission's
opinion in Chas. Pfizer & Co.74 In this case, the respondent's advertising for
"Un-Bum" sunburn treatment represented that the product anesthetized
nerves and relieved sunburn pain. The respondent had not actually conducted any scientific tests of the efficacy of "Un-Bum," but had based
its advertising representations on the fact that the active ingredients in
the product had for many years been considered by doctors to be effective in the treatment of sunburn. The Commission's complaint alleged
that Pfizer's advertisements were deceptive in that they carried the implied representation that the claims concerning the efficacy of "Un-Burn"
had been substantiated by the respondent through adequate and wellcontrolled scientific studies or tests prior to the making of such claims.
The complaint also charged that the making of the advertising representations, when such scientific studies or tests had not been conducted,
75
was "in itself" an unfair practice.
The hearing examiner dismissed the deception charge on the basis that
the advertisement did not contain the implied representation alleged by
the Commission. He also dismissed the unfairness charge, stating that it
was reasonable, not unfair, for the respondent to rely on years of clinical
experience indicating that "Un-Burn's" active ingredients were effective
7
in the relief of sunburn painY.
He did state, however, that to advertise
an untried remedy without adequate testing of any sort would constitute
an unfair trade practice. On appeal, the Commission affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner dismissing the complaint. With respect to
the unfairness charge, the Commission held that the complaint had incorrectly formulated the legal standard to be applied to respondent's
conduct. While the Commission accepted the general premise of the
complaint that an advertiser should have substantiation for advertising
74. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
19,209, at 21,388 (FTC
Apr. 16, 1970) (proposed complaint); 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,370, at 21,500
(FTC July 6, 1970) (complaint issued); id.
19,614, at 21,656 (FTC Apr. 16,
1971) (initial decision); id.
20,056, at 22,029 (FTC July 11, 1972) (final
order).
75. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
19,209, at 21,388 (FTC

Apr. 16, 1970) (proposed complaint).
76. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,614, at 21,656 (FTC Apr. 16, 1971)
decision).
77.

3 Trade Reg. Rep.

(initial

20,056, at 22,031 (FTC July 11, 1972) (final order).
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representations, it rejected the argument of complaint counsel that the
only possible valid foundation for Pfizer's advertising for "Un-Burn" was
"adequate and well-controlled scientific studies or tests." The proper
test, rather, was whether the respondent had a "reasonable basis" for
its advertising representations. On this point, Chairman Kirkpatrick's
opinion stated: "[Tihe Commission concludes that the making of an
affirmative product claim in advertising is unfair to consumers unless
there is a reasonable basis for making that claim."78
The Chairman cited the S&H decision, which had been handed down
subsequently to the issuance of the complaint in Pfizer, as a confirmation
of the Commission's jurisdiction over unfair practices. He stated that an
unfairness analysis takes into account many basic economic facts and
considerations, and permits a broad focus in the examination of marketing practices. Describing unfairness as "potentially a dynamic analytical
tool capable of a progressive, evolving application which can keep pace
with a rapidly changing economy," 79 he stated that standards of fairness
to the consumer may change as products and marketing practices change
in number, complexity, variety and function. 0
In justification of the adoption of the reasonable basis concept as a
standard of fairness, the chairman noted that:
[T]he individual consumer is at a distinct disadvantage compared to the producer or distributor of goods in reaching conclusions concerning the reliability of
product claims .... [W]ith the development and proliferation of highly complex

and technical products, there is often no practical way for consumers to ascertain
the truthfulness of affirmative product claims prior to buying and using the
product....
Given the imbalance of knowledge and resources between a business enterprise
and each of its customers, economically it is more rational, and imposes far less
cost on society, to require a manufacturer to confirm his affirmative product
upon each individual consumer to test,
claims rather than to impose a burden
8
investigate, or experiment for himself. '

The question of what constitutes a reasonable basis for a given advertising representation, the Chairman stated, is essentially a factual issue,
and will be affected by the interplay of overlapping considerations such

as: "(1 ) the type and specificity of the claim made-e.g., safety, efficacy,
dietary, health, medical; (2) the type of product-e.g., food, drug,
potentially hazardous consumer product, other consumer product; (3)
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 22,034 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 22,032.
Id.
Id. at 23,032-33.
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the possible consequences of a false claim-e.g., personal injury, property damage; (4) the degree of reliance by consumers on the claim; and
(5) the type, and accessibility, of evidence82adequate to form a reasonable basis for making the particular claim.
The opinion states further that the precise formulation of the "reasonable basis standard" is to be determined at this time on a case-by-case
basis, and that the determination of reasonable basis depends both on facts
known to the advertiser, and on those which a reasonably prudent advertiser should have discovered. In addition, the standard is determined by
the circumstances at the time the claim was made. Facts obtained subsequent to the making of the claim are irrelevant to the question of
"reasonable basis."8 "
The Chairman also noted that the reasonable basis standard "focuses
in large part on the adequacy of the underlying evidence, and is not
solely a 'reasonable man' test ....[It] evaluates both the reasonableness
of an advertiser's actions and the adequacy of the evidence upon which
such actions were based."8 4
In the Pfizer case, complaint counsel succeeded in proving that the
respondent's advertising claims were not supported by well-controlled
and adequate scientific tests conducted prior to making the claims.
However, since complaint counsel had not fully addressed the question
of whether other evidence of efficacy possessed by Pfizer, such as medical
literature and clinical experience, provided a reasonable basis for the
advertising claims, the unfairness charge was dismissed. The Commission did not remand the case for a trial de novo even though respondent's counsel had likewise failed to prove the existence of a reasonable
basis for its claims. It determined, rather, that since the advertising in
question had long been discontinued, further proceedings would not be
in the public interest.85
The significance of the Pfizer case, then, like the S&H case, lies not in
the decision on the facts of the individual case, but in the resolution of
an important question of law concerning the scope of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Although Pfizer was the first decided
case based on the "reasonable basis standard," 86 this theory was advanced
82. Id. at 22,034.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 22,039.
86: A recent case applying the reasonable basis principle is National Dynamics
Corp., No. 8803 (F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1973). Another manifestation of the Commission's commitment to the general principle of "prior substantiation of advertising

claims" emanating from the Pfizer complaint, which occurred prior to the Pfizer
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in some complaints and proposed complaints issued subsequent to the
Pfizer complaint but prior to the Pfizer decision. For example, in three
proposed complaints representing a broad-scale attack on analgesics
advertising, the Commission alleged unfairness and deception in advertising for "Anacin," "Bayer Aspirin," "Bufferin," "Excedrin" and
"Vanquish," as well as some less heavily promoted products. 87 Representations challenged in the complaints fall into five major categories:
(1) claims of therapeutic superiority; (2) the promotion of analgesics
for symptoms, such as tension, for which there exists no good evidence
that they are appropriate; (3) misuse of scientific tests and studies
concerning the efficacy of analgesic products; (4) misrepresentation of
medical endorsements; and (5) failure to disclose the presence of the
common ingredients aspirin and caffeine.
The first two categories lie at the heart of each complaint. With respect
to claims of therapeutic superiority the complaints charge that there
exists a "substantial question," recognized by scientific and medical experts, as to whether the variations in ingredients and dosage among the
analgesic products are of any significance to the relative efficacy of the
products as pain relievers. This substantial question derives primarily
from two factors: first, scientific testing of pain and analgesic effect is not
yet sufficiently precise to permit reasonably certain generalizations as to
the superiority of any ingredient, combination of ingredients, or dosages;
second, tests which have been conducted have often provided conflicting
results. The complaints take the position that, in this climate of uncertainty, it is unfair and deceptive for advertisers of analgesic products to
make unqualified claims of therapeutic superiority.
As to the promotion of the use of analgesics for symptoms such as
tension, the complaints allege that such claims are unfair to consumers
because there exists no "reasonable basis" from which to conclude that
analgesics have any effect on such symptoms. The absence of a reasonable basis stems from the lack of any valid scientific evidence that consumption of aspirin or any other analgesic will relieve tension, anxiety
or irritability, or will ease the ordinary stresses of daily life.
Additionally, the complaints focus on a common technique widely
employed in nonprescription drug advertising, namely, the citation of
scientific tests and studies to support specific advertising claims. While
decision, was the announcement of the Commission's Advertising Substantiation
Program. See notes 102-17 infra and accompanying text.
87. American Home Prods. Corp., Sterling Drug, Inc., and Bristol-Myers Co.,
19,962, at 21,983 (FTC Apr. 19, 1972) (proposed com3 Trade Reg. Rep.
plaints).
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the tests themselves may have been well-controlled and carefully run,
they are often used in advertising to over-simplify or distort the difficult
scientific issues involved. Tests and studies cannot be evaluated
in a vacuum; they can only be properly judged in light of scientific
knowledge already accumulated, including the results of prior similar
tests. When a single test is cited, especially when it is described as
"exciting" or said to have been performed at a "leading hospital," it
carries with it the aura of absolute scientific "proof." In any field, and
especially in the analgesics area, the use of isolated test data to bolster
an advertiser's claim is both misleading and unfair.
As with advertising references to test results, a claim that doctors
recommend or prefer one product to all others purports to be "proof" of
the product's superiority. While the complaints do not take the position
that medical endorsements are in themselves unfair, the misuse of survey
data to imply an endorsement, where none exists, is clearly misleading,
and has been attacked.
The proposed orders in the analgesics cases seek the remedy of corrective advertising. This remedy is particularly appropriate in these
cases, for the themes challenged in the proposed complaints have been
repeated at heavy intensity for long periods of time.",
In another case involving the reasonable basis principle, the Commission's proposed complaint challenged weight-reduction claims for sugar
made by two trade associations, composed of growers, refiners and processors of sugar8 9 The proposed complaint alleged generally that respondents' advertisements had unfairly represented that consumption of
sugar and foods containing sugar before meals is an effective means of
reducing human weight and maintaining reduced weight, when there
existed no reasonable basis for these representations at the time they were
made. The consent order in this case prohibits the dissemination of such
unsubstantiated weight reduction claims for sugar, and misrepresentations of its nutritional value in weight-reduction dieting. The consent
order also contains a corrective advertising provision, which prescribes
the text of a corrective message which must be clearly and conspicuously
stated in advertisements to appear in issues of seven major magazines. 0
88.

See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.

89.

Sugar Ass'n, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.

19,857, at 21,872 (FTC Dec. 2,

1971) (proposed complaint); id.
20,085, at 22,054 (FTC Aug. 18, 1972)
(consent order provisionally accepted); id.
20,142, at 22,131 (FTC Nov. 1,
1972) (consent order finally accepted).
90.

Id. t 20,142, at 22,131. The required message reads as follows: "Do you

recall the message we brought you in the past about sugar? How something with
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As a vehicle for the exercise of the Commission's power to prevent
trade practices which are unfair to consumers, the reasonable basis
theory promises to develop into an extremely useful legal tool. Its most
significant contribution to the Commission's enforcement program is that
it renders susceptible to litigation advertising practices which previously
were difficult to deal with by means of a standard false advertising complaint. In areas such as analgesics, for example, where scientific or
technical knowledge is undeveloped or in conflict, it may be as difficult
for the Commission's staff to utilize such knowledge to prove the falsity
of an affirmative product claim as it is for the advertiser to prove the
truth of the claim. However, it may be possible under such circumstances
to prove that it was unreasonable for the advertiser, in making the claim,
to rely on the information he did possess. In these cases, it is unrealistic
to look to the proven truth or falsity of affirmative product claims as the
standard against which advertising should be measured. It is equally
undesirable, however, to give the advertiser free rein in such cases. He
must be required to deal honestly with the consumer, and the most
practicable method of assuring such honest dealing is to require simply
that he act reasonably in light of all circumstances known to him or
which he should have discovered before making the claim.
3. Advertising Addressed to Children
In almost every area of the law, the principle has long been established
that children require special legal protection over and above that provided to adults. Early in the history of the Federal Trade Commission,
this principle was incorporated into the law of unfair trade practices by
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Keppel case.9 ' The issue of the
particular vulnerability of children to unlawful trade practices has also
been involved in other Commission cases.9 2
In Keppel, the Supreme Court impliedly recognized that whether a
practice is unfair or deceptive under section 5 depends primarily on its
effect on the consumer group to which it is addressed. The test of legality
is not keyed to the understanding of a "reasonable adult." It is settled
sugar in it before meals could help you curb your appetite? We hope you didn't
get the idea that our little diet tip was any magic formula for losing weight.
Because there are no tricks, or shortcuts, the whole diet subject is very complicated. Research hasn't established that consuming sugar before meals will contribute to weight reduction or even keep you from gaining weight. Id.
91. See note 49 supra.
92. E.g., Ideal Toy Corp., 64 F.T.C. 297, 310 (.1964); Wilson Chem. Co., 64
F.T.C. 168, 183 (1964).
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law, rather, that section 5 was intended to protect "the most ignorant
and unsuspecting purchaser." 98 Advertising addressed to children must
be judged according to the way children understand its meaning and are
affected by it. Consequently, a given advertising practice can be unfair
or deceptive with respect to children even if it would not be unlawful
if directed only to adults.
The principle that advertising addressed to children must be evaluated
in fight of the level of competence of its audience was expressly
articulated for the first time in a group of consent orders accepted by
the Commission concerning toy advertising. In Mattel, Inc.94 and Topper
Corp.," the proposed complaints challenged advertising for the "Hot
Wheels" and "Johnny Lightning" race cars, and the "Dancerina Doll."
They alleged that the advertisements were unfair or deceptive in that,
among other things: (1) special ifilming techniques were used to exaggerate or falsely represent the appearance and performance of the
various toys, and to convey a sense of achievement or participation in
the use of the toys which could not be achieved; and (2) endorsements
by famous racing drivers were used for the "Johnny Lightning" and "Hot
Wheels" toys, when the special competence of these drivers pertains only
to actual auto racing and does not give them special qualifications to
judge the worth, value or desirability to children of the respective toys.
In addition to alleging that the actual content of these television
advertisements was unfair or deceptive, the proposed complaints alleged
that the advertising was unfair in that: (1) it exploited children, who
were unqualified by age or experience to anticipate or appreciate the
possibility that the advertising representations might be exaggerated or
untrue; and (2) it played upon the affection of parents for their children,
by causing children to become "lobbyists" in the home for the advertised
product.
The consent orders signed by the respondents, in addition to prohibiting the challenged practices, contain language to the effect that possible
deception in the respondents' advertisements must be evaluated in fight
of the "level of knowledge, sophistication, maturity, and experience" of
93. Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946) (citation omitted). Accord, Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679
(2nd Cir. 1944).
94. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,398, at 21,519 (FTC Nov. 25, 1970) (proposed
complaint); id.
19,735, at 21,786 (FTC July 26, 1971) (consent order provisionally accepted); id. 19,850, at 21,869 (FTC Nov. 1, 1971) (consent order
finally accepted).
95.

Id.
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the age group or groups to which the advertisements are addressed.00
Thus, these consent orders expressly adopt the principle, impliedly
recognized in decisions dating back to Keppel, that children are a special
class of consumers, and must be treated as such by businessmen.
Although all food and beverage advertising is potentially of significance to the development of children, children are exposed to advertisements for certain foods more than others. One of the food products
most heavily advertised to children on Saturday and Sunday morning
television is breakfast cereal. In the context of what is primarily an
antitrust case, the Commission has issued a complaint against the Kellogg
Company, General Mills, Inc., General Foods Corporation and the
Quaker Oats Company alleging that advertisements for respondents'
cereals addressed to children have the tendency and capacity to mislead
children into the mistaken belief that respondents' cereals are different
from other ready-to-eat cereals. 7 This practice, the complaint charges,
facilitates artificial differentiation and brand proliferation, and has contributed to respondents' ability to obtain and maintain monopoly prices
and to exclude competitors from the manufacture and sale of ready-toeat cereal.
The complaint specifically challenges representations that: (1) respondents' cereals, without any other foods, enable children to perform
certain physical activities depicted in the advertisements; and (2)
consumption of respondents' cereals at breakfast will produce a loss of
body weight without vigorous adherence to a reduced calorie diet, will
result in maintenance of present body weight even if total caloric intake
increases, or will result in loss or maintenance of body weight without
adherence to regular physical exercise. The proposed order provides that
if the Commission should conclude from the record developed in adjudication of the case that these advertising practices are anti-competitive,
they may be prohibited. Thus, although this case is founded primarily
on antitrust considerations, a decision upholding the complaint is likely
to result in the elimination of certain objectionable practices in cereal
advertising addressed to children.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the litigation concerning the
96. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
19,735, at 21,787.
97. Kellogg Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,898, at 21,915 (FTC Jan. 24, 1972)
(proposed complaint); id. (FTC Apr. 26, 1972) (complaint issued). Recently
General Foods Corp. has brought suit to block further proceedings under this
complaint. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, Civil No. KI-73-CA9 (W. D, Mich.,
filed Jan. 2, 1973).
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cereals case is the involvement of advertising questions in an antitrust
matter. In essence, the cereal complaints charge that the companies cited
therein restrained trade by, inter alia, engaging in a common course of
conduct, which included massive "false" advertising. Whether members
of a concentrated industry would violate the law by engaging in a restrictive common course of conduct which included massive "legal" advertising expenditures is a question which is not raised by the cereal
complaints.
In considering various problems raised by advertising addressed to
children, the Commission has come to appreciate the need to accumulate
a body of general information in this area, which may be drawn upon
in the analysis of specific matters. This realization was one of the
motivating forces behind the organization of the Commission's Hearings
on Modern Advertising Practices, held in the autumn of 1971. A number of experts from a variety of fields, including child psychology and
child psychiatry, testified at these hearings. One of the primary purposes
of the hearings was to gain insight into the way children respond to
advertisements and are affected by them. Another purpose was to
acquaint the Commission, through the testimony of members of the
advertising industry, with technical aspects of the preparation and production of television commercials which may facilitate deception such
as that involved in the Mattel and Topper cases. The Commission has
gained much valuable information from these hearings, which will be
of assistance in dealing with the highly complex area of children's
advertising.
Rule-Making
In addition to adjudication of individual cases, the Federal Trade
Commission exercises its regulatory power in the form of rule-making.
The preparation of the Commission's trade regulation rules is carried
on primarily in the Division of Rules and Guides.
The basic purpose of a trade regulation rule proceeding is to determine whether a particular type of promotional technique amounts to an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, and, if so, to announce to the industry involved,
by promulgation of a trade regulation rule, the steps which must be
taken to avoid violation of the Act. Once a trade regulation rule is
promulgated, it must be enforced by the issuance of a complaint for
violation of the rule. However, because the Commission has already
determined that failure to adhere to the rule is a violation of section 5,
B.
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the only issues to be resolved during the hearing on the complaint are:
(1) the existence of the rule; (2) its applicability to the advertising or
practice in question; and (3) its violation. If these three elements are
established, it is not necessary for the administrative law judge or the
Commission to determine whether section 5 has been violated by the
advertising in question. In theory, the existence of an applicable trade
regulation rule should enable complaints to be handled swiftly and with
greater uniformity of results. Additionally, the trade regulation rule
proceeding should produce one other economy by laying down a carefully enunciated rule which is industry-wide in scope. In a field where
dozens to hundreds of firms are competing with one another it is expected
that a large majority of these firms will make a good faith effort to
comply voluntarily with an administrative determination, particularly
when it is made after the regulated industry has been given an opportunity to submit data, views and arguments during a public hearing held
in connection with the rule-making proceeding.9"
The Commission's authority to issue trade regulation rules has recently been called into question by the decision in National Petroleum
Refiners Association v. FTC.9 The case involved a trade regulation rule
declaring that the failure to post octane ratings on gasoline pumps at
service stations would be an unfair method of competition and a deceptive practice in violation of section 5. Stating that the issue was one of
"first impression," the court held that the Federal Trade Commission Act
did not grant the Commission the requisite authority to issue trade
regulation rules. 100
A lengthy analysis of the Commission's authority to issue trade regulation rules has been provided elsewhere'01 and would be extraneous to the
purposes of this article. It is sufficient here to note that I am firmly
convinced the Commission does have the power under the Federal
Trade Commission Act to issue such rules and am confident that this
power will be upheld on appeal of the National Petroleum Refiners case.
Im. Alternatives to Adjudication and Rule-Making

Part I of this article has discussed recent efforts of the Federal Trade
Commission to attain effective enforcement of the Federal Trade Com98. For a detailed discussion of the Commission's trade regulation rule proceeding, see Statement of Basis, supra note 8, at 8324.
99. 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
100. Id. at 1346.
101. See Statement of Basis, supra note 8, at 8324.

386

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

mission Act through the two traditional forms of regulatory activityadjudication and rule-making. It should be apparent from the discussion
in Part I that the Commission regards these traditional forms of regulation as vital to its consumer protection program.
Certain limitations, however, are inherent in these procedures. With
respect to adjudication, for example, the Commission is unable to issue
a complaint against every advertising deception of which it may become
aware. Because the resources at the disposal of the Commission are
limited, priorities must be assigned, and significant advertising abuses
must often be neglected purely because of a lack of manpower. Also,
litigation is a costly and time-consuming method of correcting advertising abuses, and by the time the litigation has been concluded, the damage
often has already been done.
Most important, perhaps, is the fact that litigation and rule-making
are appropriate only for attacking specific instances of deception or
unfairness in advertising. Their primary purpose is to reduce the amount
of misinformation being disseminated to consumers. Even the adjudicative remedies of affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising, which
require the disclosure of truthful information, are designed primarily to
eradicate representations which have been established to be false or
unfair.
Realizing that litigation and rule making can be of only limited
benefit in the quest to provide consumers with relevant product information, the Commission has recently initiated one program and supported
another designed to make positive contributions to the amount of accurate information available to consumers. Part II of this article will be
devoted to discussion of these programs.
A. The Advertising Substantiation Program
1. Purpose
In June of 1971, the Commission announced its issuance of a resolution which requires advertisers to submit to the Commission, upon
demand, documentation to support claims regarding the safety, performance, efficacy, quality or comparative price of the product advertised.'" 2 The documentation required is that which the advertiser had in
its possession prior to the time claims were made. The Commission's
102. Resolution Requiring Submission of Special Reports Relating To Advertising Claims and Disclosure Thereof by the Commission in Connection with a
Public Investigation, issued July 9, 1971; amended July 7, 1971 [hereinafter cited
as Substantiation Resolution].
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authority to require such submissions is granted by section 6(b) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 10 Furthermore section 6(f) of the
Act authorizes the Commission to make materials submitted under
section 6(b), except for privileged or confidential information, available
to the public.
The policy considerations upon which public disclosure of these
materials is made are the following:
(1) Public disclosure can assist consumers in making a rational
choice among competing claims which purport to be based on objective
evidence and in evaluating the weight to be accorded to such claims.
(2) The public's need for this information is not being met voluntarily by advertisers.
(3) Public disclosure can enhance competition by encouraging competitors to challenge advertising claims which have no basis in fact.
(4) The knowledge that documentation or the lack thereof will be
made public will encourage advertisers to have on hand adequate
substantiation before claims are made.
(5) The Commission has limited resources for detecting claims
which are not substantiated by adequate proof. By making documentation submitted in response to this resolution available to the public,
the Commission can be alerted by consumers, businessmen, and
public interest groups to possible violations of section 5 of the Federal
04
Trade Commission Act.1

To date, Orders to File Special Reports under the substantiation
program have been sent to advertisers of automobiles, 05° air condi103. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1970). Section 6 states in part that: "The commission
shall also have power . . . (b) To require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the
Act to regulate commerce, or any class of them, or any of them, respectively, to
file with the commission in such form as the commission may prescribe annual
or special, or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific
questions, furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as
to the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to
other corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective corporations
filing such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall be made
under oath, or otherwise, as the commission ... within such reasonable period as

the commission may prescribe, unless additional time be granted in any case by
the commission." Id.
104.

Substantiation Resolution, supra note 102 at 3-4.
19,698, at 21,743 (FTC July 13,

105. General Motors, 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
1971).
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tioners,1°6 electric shavers, 0 7 televisions,' ° dentifrices, 0 9 cough and cold
remedies, 110 tires,"' soaps and detergents," 2 hearing aids," 8 and pet
114
foods.

Some of the material submitted has already been made public, 115 and
the balance of the material will be released after it has been reviewed
by the Commission staff.
The substantiation program has been the subject of some criticism. It
has been said that public response to the program has been insignificant,
and that consumers are not using the information submitted. Another
criticism has been that the material submitted is too technical to be of
use to consumers in making purchasing decisions. With respect to the
latter point, it is only logical to expect that much of the documentation
for advertising claims for automobiles or televisions win be technical
in nature. The Commission never expected consumers to be able to use
the material in this form. However, the Commission itself does not have
the resources to translate the information into a form which can be used
by the average consumer. This function must be performed by outside
consumer groups or other organizations which have the knowledge and
resources necessary to accomplish such a task. Once such studies of the
material are undertaken and information is disseminated in a form the
average consumer can understand, it is likely that consumers will begin
to make extensive use of the material.
Moreover, the Commission is determined to follow a new path in
future substantiation orders. Instead of seeking documentation for each
and every assertion, section 6(b) orders will be directed toward those
three or four themes in the advertising material which are the major
"selling themes" of the product's advertising. Particular focus will be
given to claims common to the industry. In this fashion, the claims upon
106. Whirlpool Corp., id. 19,771, at 21,812 (FTC Aug. 24, 1971); Admiral
Corp., id. 19,828, at 21,839 (FTC Oct. 14, 1971).
107. North Am. Philips Corp., id. 19,772, at 21,813 (FTC Aug. 24, 1971).
108. Admiral Corp., id. 19,828, at 21,839 (FTC Oct. 14, 1971).
109. Beecham, Inc., id. 19,879, at 21,890 (FTC Dec. 22, 1971).
110. American Home Prods. Corp., id.
19,905, at 21,920 (FTC Jan. 31,
1972).
111. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., id. 20,009, at 22,007 (FTC May 24,
1972).
112. American Cyanamid Co., id. 20,040, at 22,024 (FTC June 28, 1972);
American Brands, Inc., id. 20,103, at 22,065 (FTC Sept. 20, 1972).
113. Widex Hearing Aid Co., id. 20,059, at 22,040 (FTC July 26, 1972).
i14. Allied Mills, Inc., id. 20,148, at 22,133 (FTC Nov. 24, 1972).
115. Material submitted to the Commission in response to § 6(b) orders is
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which advertisers primarily rely will be those on which the 6(b) program
is concentrated, and the efficiency of the program may be increased.
Another change in future 6(b) orders will be the inclusion of a request
to companies to submit, in addition to the technical documentation, a
"running narrative summary" in layman's language of the substantiation
which exists for the claims covered by the 6(b) orders.
2. Cases
Although the primary purpose of the Commission's advertising substantiation program is to make product information available to consumers, complaints may be issued where the substantiation submitted is
patently inadequate to support the claims made. Such was the case with
four proposed complaints recently issued by the Commission, three
against manufacturers of air conditioners and one against an automobile
manufacturer, attacking advertising representations which had been the
subject of section 6 (b) orders.
In General Motors Corp.,"' the proposed complaint alleged that
General Motors had no reasonable basis for the claims that: (1) the
Chevrolet Vega is the best handling passenger car ever built in the
United States; and (2) the Buick Opel has a chassis which never requires
lubrication. The three proposed complaints against air conditioner
manufacturers allege that the following claims are deceptive: (1)
Fedders "reserve cooling power" is a unique feature of Fedders air conditioners; (2) Whirlpool's "Panic Button" is a unique feature of Whirlpool air conditioners; and (3) Rheem residential central air conditioning systems are "revolutionary" and are the most efficient central cooling
systems available." 7
These proposed complaints also allege that the respondents' advertisements were unfair in that the respondents had no reasonable basis for
the following claims: (1) Fedders ACL air conditioners have a reserve
cooling capacity that is substantially greater than that of competing
systems; (2) Rheem residential central air conditioners are the quietest
systems available; and (3) Whirlpool's initial cooling capability is substantially greater than that of competing air conditioners.
available for examination in the Commission's Legal and Public Records Division
(Room 130) in Washington and in the Commission's regional offices, and may
be purchased from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal
Rd., Springfield, Va. 22151.
116. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 20,120, at 22,102 (FTC Oct. 12, 1972) (proposed

complaint).
117. Fedders Corp., Rheem Mfg. Co., and Whirlpool Corp., id.

390

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

Besides halting the challenged practices, the proposed orders in these
four cases would require each firm to maintain, for three years after any
future advertising claim is made, records detailing the documentation
for such claim.
It is interesting to note that these cases in a sense represent the culmination of the Commission's efforts to combine innovative theories
and programs into an integrated approach to advertising regulation.
They arose out of the new substantiation program, which is based on
the fundamental premise that an advertiser should possess substantiation
for its advertising claims. In addition, they combined the "reasonable
basis" principle of Pfizer with the "unfairness doctrine" of S&H, which
yielded the theory that the failure to possess substantiation amounts to
a lack of reasonable basis, which in turn is an unfair act or practice
under section 5.
B.

Counter-Advertising

Another Federal Trade Commission action which furthers the principle that the consumer should have as much objective information as
possible to enable him to make a rational purchasing decision is its
recent Statement in Support of Counter-Advertising."" This statement
was submitted to the Federal Communications Commission in response
to the FCC's Notice of Inquiry concerning the "Fairness Doctrine," 19
particularly in response to Part III of the Inquiry, entitled "Access to
the Broadcast Media as a result of Carriage of Product Commercials."
The term "counter-advertising" refers to the right of access in certain
defined circumstances of consumer groups and other qualified and interested persons to the broadcast media for the purpose of expressing
views and positions on issues raised by commercial advertising. The FTC
has recommended that the FCC establish rules creating "open availability" for paid advertising and paid counter-advertising. 20 The Commission has also recommended that free access be given, in prime time, for
discussion of controversial issues raised by commercial messages in certain carefully defined circumstances.
The FTC statement to the FCC acknowledges that advertising plays
an important and necessary role in the dissemination of information in
a competitive, free-enterprise economy. However, advertising today is
118. On file with FCC in connection with current inquiry into the "Fairness
Doctrine."
119. Id.
120. Id.
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largely a one-way street. Its usual technique is to provide only one
aspect of any story. It is probably the only form of public discussion
where there presently exists no public debate. The purpose of counteradvertising is to make such debate possible and to encourage the dissemination of legitimate and relevant information not presently being
made available to consumers. The desired result would be that the consumer would be made aware of all of the significant implications raised
by advertisements.
Clearly, counter-advertising, like the substantiation program, is pertinent to the effectiveness of an over-all program of advertising regulation.
Both are necessary supplements to, not substitutes for, the traditional
adjudicative approach which has been the Commission's. main tool for
the regulation of advertising in the past. They will serve to fill gaps
where regulation by litigation or rule-making is inappropriate or unfeasible. For example, where advertising claims are based on controversial facts or opinions, litigation may fail to resolve the controversy.
Counter-advertising would at least subject such claims to open discussion,
so that consumers would not be given the impression that controversial
opinions are established facts. Counter-advertising would also be an
effective means of dealing with claims which the substantiation program
cannot reach because they are not "objectively verifiable."
The Commission's statement to the FCC suggests four major categories of advertising which seem appropriate areas for counteradvertising:
(1) Advertising which makes claims of product performance or
characteristics that explicitly raise controversial issues of current public importance, e.g., ads explicitly addressed to issues of ecology,
nutrition and automobile safety.
(2) Advertising which stresses broad, recurrent themes which affect
a purchasing decision in a manner that implicitly raises controversial
issues of current public importance, e.g., food ads which may be
viewed as encouraging poor nutritional habits, or detergent ads which
may be viewed as contributing to water pollution.
(3) Advertising claims that rely upon scientific premises currently
subject to controversy within the scientific community, e.g., advertisements promoting a drug as effective in curing or preventing various
problems and ailments. The claims might be based on the opinions
of some members of the scientific community whose opinions may be
hotly contested by other experts.
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(4) Advertising that is silent about negative aspects of the advertised
product, e.g., advertisements for small automobiles which emphasize
such factors as low cost and economy, without informing the public
of countervailing considerations, for example, that such cars are
arguably less safe than larger cars.
Of course, in order for a counter-advertising program to be effective,
the counter-messages must be responsible and must be designed by persons who are informed on the issues. The logical organizations to play
such a role are the consumer and public interest groups which today
abound in the United States.
It should be emphasized that the Commission's position on counteradvertising does not envision free time being given except in situations
where there are no other means to pay for the time. Even more important
is the fact that the Commission's position does not envision a Babel-like
future for commercial television, in which there would be a countercommercial for every commercial appearing on the air. Instead, there
would only be counter-commercials for those commercials which raised
truly controversial issues of public importance, and as to which there
was little or no presentation of the opposite viewpoint on the airwaves,
whether in commercials or other forms of broadcast expression. Such
counter-commercials could, under the FTC proposal, even be bunched
in one time slot of perhaps 5 to 15 minutes once a week. It is at least
arguable that such a program would be one of the more interesting ones
on television, possibly attracting a large and loyal audience of viewers. 2 '
IV. Conclusion

Advertising, in the classic economic system of modified capitalism,
under which this country operates, performs a very key function. That
function is to provide meaningful information about products to consumers who then will be able to make rational choices from amongst
competing products. To the extent that advertising performs this function, it is playing its proper role; to the extent it does not so perform,
it is malfunctioning.
121. It should also be noted that the Commission staff has stated its belief that
counter-advertisers who engage in misrepresentation in counter-commercials
would be subject to FTC regulation. Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Director,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, 1972 American Advertising Federation Convention and Public Affairs Conference, panel discussion of Advertising and The Law
at 27-30,
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In the past, the law has been directed mainly toward advertising which
communicates misinformation. Such advertising is subject to attack on
an economic as well as legal base and will continue to be the target of
much advertising regulation. The Federal Trade Commission, as the
primary regulator of advertising, has taken some initial steps which it is
hoped will lead to more effective regulation of misinformative advertising. Because the Commission's mandate is broad and its resources
limited, the first requirement is that the Commission adopt a programmatic approach to advertising regulation, selecting for action those
matters which are most significant in terms of impact on consumers and
the economy. The next step is to develop more meaningful remedies;
it must not only seek to stop misinformative advertising, but also attempt
to correct the impact such advertising may have had on the marketplace.
The Commission, as noted earlier in this article, has taken steps to become more selective in the choosing of cases, and to develop more meaningful remedies such as corrective advertising.
Dealing with advertising other than that which is simply misinformative, or attempting to furnish to consumers more relevant product information than that which is now available in advertising, has been more
difficult. However, the Commission of the 1970's will, in my judgment,
be compelled to focus increasingly on these problems. Some progress
has been made in defining certain areas where information is so vital
that it must be disclosed in advertising (such as the statement of the
Surgeon General's findings of the health hazards of cigarette smoking
being required in cigarette advertising). Beyond that, the Commission
has, through the 6(b) advertising substantiation program discussed
earlier, made available to consumers the data upon which advertisers
purport to rely in asserting advertising claims.
It is not the intent of the Commission or its staff to take a position
that every possibly relevant or useful piece of information about advertised products must be disclosed. It is clear that a program with that goal
in mind would be counter-productive-it would furnish consumers with
more than they would care to know. What is being considered is an effort
to determine what information is so material and meaningful that it
must be disclosed, and to establish what means can best be used to insure
more disclosures of pertinent information to consumers-whether
directly in advertising, or counter-advertising, through advertising substantiation demands or by other means. Development of more means of
disseminating information to consumers will lead our system to an era in
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which consumers may in fact exercise the sovereignty in the marketplace which the system in theory grants them.
In the field of advertising regulation much remains to be done, but
the FTC has at least begun to undertake the task. The public interest
demands that the challenges of the undertaking be met and mastered.

